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  We study 298 firms that announce the intent to consider restructuring during the 
1989 to 1998 period. We find that the actions taken subsequent to the initial restructuring 
consideration are equally divided between (i) being acquired, (ii) divesting one or more 
subsidiaries, or (iii) either terminating the process or declaring bankruptcy. There is a 
greater completion rate in the second half of the sample, which suggests that economy-
wide factors influence the restructuring decision. For the average firm in the sample, 
restructuring is a positive net present value decision, although sustained positive 
shareholder returns accrue only to the firms that actually complete restructuring. For a 
sub-sample of firms that are acquired, we detail the private auction process that is 
initiated and conducted by the selling firms and their investment banks. In the private 
auction, 80 percent of the selling firms have multiple bidders, even though only 20 
percent of these cases have more than one publicly announced bidder. The depth of the 
private auction affects the runup of stock prices prior to the formal acquisition offer, 
suggesting a reinterpretation of the traditional explanations for the variation in premiums 
across target firms. The use of private auctions by selling firms also suggests one reason 
for the absence of toeholds in many mergers as well as the occurrence of multiple public 
bids even when there is only a single public bidder in a merger. 
   1
Corporate Restructuring and Corporate Auctions 
 
 
  In this paper, we analyze the process of corporate restructuring during the 1990s. 
We begin with a sample of 298 firms that announce the intention to restructure during the 
1989 to 1998 period. We then track the extent to which these firms actually restructure by 
either divesting assets or being acquired. We compare the valuation effects of the firms 
that divest, are acquired, and do not implement restructuring. For the firms that are 
acquired, we also provide a detailed analysis of the private auction process by which the 
firms are sold. 
  One aim of our study is to improve the understanding of the causes and effects of 
corporate restructuring during the 1990s. A recent portrayal by Holmstrom and Kaplan 
(2001, pp.132-133) depicts the 1990s as a period where “companies voluntarily 
restructured and adopted a shareholder value perspective” in part motivated by the fear of 
1980s-style hostile takeovers. One question raised by such a depiction is why the 
restructuring in the 1990s took so long to unfold. Consistent with other research, we show 
that the majority of the restructuring in the 1990s occurred in the latter part of the decade. 
An innovation in our analysis is that we contrast both the proposed intention to 
restructure with actual implementation and thereby indicate the importance of economy-
wide factors in the restructuring decision. 
  Our analysis also aims to better discern the nature of the competition in the 
merger market in the 1990s. Summarizing their comparison of the 1990s with other 
periods, Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001, p.201) state, “The picture of mergers in 
the 1990s that emerges is one where merging parties … negotiate a friendly stock swap.” 
One question that arises from such a picture is why bidding firms in the 1990s earn non-  2
positive returns. Theory (e.g., Bulow and Klemperer (1996)) would suggest that in 
friendly, negotiated mergers, target firms would be able to extract a lower fraction of 
rents. Yet bidders in the 1990s fared no better than in prior periods. Andrade, Mitchell 
and Stafford (2001, p. 118) note that competing bidders provide a possible explanation 
for the general result of breakeven bidder returns, but acknowledge that such an 
explanation appears less applicable to the 1990s, a period where mergers usually had only 
a single public bidder. 
  Our analysis of the sales process indicates that the emphasis on the number of 
public bidders provides an incomplete picture of the competitiveness of mergers in the 
1990s. For a sub-set of firms in our sample that are acquired, we are able to gather details 
of the auction procedure by which the firms are sold. Working with their investment 
bank, the firms in the auction sample solicit private sealed-bids from potential buyers. In 
80 percent of these cases, there are multiple written bids in the private auction, even 
though only 20 percent of the cases have more than one firm making a public bid for the 
selling firm. The use of private auctions by selling firms provides a possible reason why 
bidders only break even in the 1990s. 
  We also study the manner in which the use of private auctions affects the pattern 
of stock returns in the period surrounding the public announcement of formal merger 
bids. In his analysis of runup and markup, Schwert (1996) uses auction terminology to 
refer to the number of competing public bidders in a merger. He conjectures (p.188) that 
the runup before a public bid “foreshadows” a public auction. Our analysis of private 
auctions suggests, alternatively, that the magnitude of the runup “reflects” the depth of 
the private auction.   3
  Our evidence on the nature of the sales process in the auction sample indicates a 
setting where the seller, rather than a potential bidder, initiates and administers the 
transaction. Broader recognition of such a setting may help to resolve puzzles in extant 
empirical results. For example, Betton and Eckbo (2000) report that a bidder in a 
takeover sometimes makes a second bid even in the absence of a competing public 
bidder. Perhaps the response by the public bidder reflects that bidder’s and/or the seller’s 
knowledge of the competing bidders in the private auction. Similarly, Betton and Eckbo 
(2000) report that bidders often do not invest in a toehold even though a toehold seems to 
be a profitable strategy. The absence of a toehold in many cases may stem from the 
control of the auction process by the selling firm as modeled by French and McCormick 
(1984), Bulow, Huang, and Klemperer (1999), and Hansen (2001). 
  We present our analysis as follows. Section 1 describes the sample of firms that 
announce the intention to restructure. Section 2 describes the sub-set of firms for which 
we can obtain information on the auction process. Section 3 reports the wealth effects of 
the different restructuring methods. Section 4 estimates the effect of the private auction 
process on the runup and markup around acquisition offers. Section 5 provides a 
summary and concluding comments. 
 
1. The Sample 
1.A. Sample Formation 
We develop a sample of firms that announce that they are considering restructuring 
and then track which firms actually take restructuring actions such as divesting assets or 
being acquired. To form our sample, we employ keyword searches on Lexis/Nexis and   4
manual searches of the Wall Street Journal Index during the ten-year period from 1989 to 
1998. On Lexis/Nexis, we search for firms announcing that they were evaluating 
“strategic options” or “strategic alternatives.” In the Wall Street Journal Index, we search 
the “Divestiture” section for firms that announced that they were considering 
restructuring. After the initial search, we eliminate privately held entities and non-U.S. 
companies by requiring that the firm’s common stock be listed in the Daily Stock Price 
Record at the time of the initial announcement. 
These searches produced a sample of announcements of possible restructuring by 
298 firms from the 1989 to 1998 period. Table 1 reports the distribution of the sample by 
the year of the initial announcement. Given that there are 298 sample firms in the ten-
year period, there are roughly 30 observations per year. The annual number of 
observations ranges from 20 in 1989 to 52 in 1998. There are 130 firms (44 percent of the 
sample) in the first five years of the sample, 1989-1993, and 168 firms (56 percent) in the 
second five years, 1994-1998. 
Table 1 also reports the average size of the sample firms. Size is based on equity 
value 21 days prior to the initial announcement date. The mean (median) firm size in the 
sample is $2.295 billion ($109 million). The largest firm in the sample is NYSE-listed 
Pfizer and the smallest firm is NASDAQ-listed EcoTyre Technologies. Both firms 
announced the intent to restructure in 1998. As a whole, 132 sample firms (44 percent) 
were listed on the NYSE at the time of the initial announcement, 140 (47 percent) were 
listed on NASDAQ, and 26 (9 percent) were listed on AMEX.   5
1.B. Categorization of the Initial Announcement 
As reported in Table 2, the initial announcements can be grouped into four 
mutually exclusive categories. Thirty-three of the firms (11 percent) announced that they 
were considering restructuring following outside pressure. Roughly half of the cases of 
outside pressure entail a failed merger or third party takeover bid while the other half 
stem from blockholder activity or a proxy contest. Ninety-six firms (32 percent) 
announced that the potential restructuring included the possible sale of the entire 
corporation. Seventy-five firms (25 percent) made a broad statement that they were 
considering restructuring. Finally, ninety-four firms (32 percent) announced that they 
were evaluating the restructuring of a particular division or subsidiary of a firm. 
An example of each of the four initial announcement categories is provided 
below: 
Category: Outside Pressure 
First Financial Corporation of Western Maryland, 1996 
 
“First Financial Corporation of Western Maryland, a $322 million-asset thrift in Cumberland, said this 
week it hired Alex Brown & Sons Inc. to determine various strategic options for the company, including its 
‘possible sale.’ The announcement came just three weeks after the thrift’s largest investor, Seymour 
Holtzman of Boca Raton, Fla., urged the company in a filing to find a buyer. 
“Under Pressure, Md. Thrift Hires Adviser on Possible Sale,” The American Banker, August 22, 1996, p.6. 
 
 
Category: Possible Sale 
Comprehensive Care Corp., 1989 
 
“Comprehensive Care Corp. said Thursday that it has appointed a special committee of directors to 
evaluate strategic alternatives, including a possible financial restructuring, asset sale or acquisition by 
another company. In a statement, the company said it believed that its stock was selling for less than true 
value, which played a role in the decision by its board to chart a new business strategy.” 
“Compcare Says It’s Considering Restructuring,” Los Angeles Times, February 10, 1989, p.D2. 
 
 
Category: General Restructuring 
Century Communications Corp. (1998) 
 
“The Century Communications Corporation, the ninth-largest United States cable-television operator, said 
yesterday that it had hired the investment banker Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Inc. to explore strategic 
options for the company. The company did not elaborate on the alternatives.”   6
“Century Communications is Exploring Options,” New York Times, December 17, 1998, p.C4. 
 
 
Category: Specific Division 
Monsanto (1996) 
 
“Monsanto Co. said it will consider spinning off or selling its flagship chemical business, a move that 
would shift its focus to its promising agricultural biotechnology business… Company officials said it has 
hired Goldman, Sachs & Co. to analyze its options, which include a spinoff of chemical options or merging 
the business with another chemical company that would lead to an eventual spinoff. Less likely … is an 
outright sale of the business, though such a move hasn’t been ruled out.” 
“Monsanto May Shed Its Chemical Unit,” Wall Street Journal, October 11, 1996, p.A3. 
 
The four examples suggest that the restructuring process weighed by the sample firms 
envisioned a variety of possible alternatives including financial restructuring, asset sales, 
spinoffs and outright sale of the company. 
A notable aspect of the initial announcements that is indicated by the four 
examples above is that the news stories usually report that the firm has hired an 
investment bank as part of its evaluation of restructuring options. In total, 83 percent of 
the sample firms identify their investment bank in the initial announcement. Goldman 
Sachs has the highest incidence in the sample with 37 observations. The inclusion of the 
investment bank in the initial announcement indicates that the announcement is not 
merely cheap talk and also provides a contact for inquiries by parties interested in all or 
part of the assets of the restructuring firm. 
  1.C. Categorization by the Intermediate Announcement 
  For each of the 298 firms, we use Lexis/Nexis and other financial media to track 
any restructuring activity following the initial announcement. We categorize the firms 
based on whether they made an intermediate announcement that they were the object of 
an acquisition offer or had agreed to divest a subsidiary or other assets.   7
  Table 3 reports the categorization of the sample based on the intermediate 
announcement of restructuring. Ninety-seven of the firms (33 percent) announced that 
they were the object of an acquisition offer. One hundred twelve firms (37 percent) 
announced that they had agreed to divest a unit or units. Hence, 70 percent of the sample 
firms that initially proposed restructuring later announced an actual restructuring action. 
The remaining 30 percent of the firms in the sample did not announce an acquisition offer 
or a divestiture subsequent to the initial consideration of restructuring. 
  1.D. Categorization by Event Completion 
We also categorize the sample based on the completion of restructuring. For the 
70 percent of the sample that announced an acquisition offer or divestiture agreement, we 
determine whether the planned restructuring was actually completed. For the remaining 
30 percent of the sample, we examine whether there was any other evidence of the 
completion of the restructuring process. 
Table 4 reports the categorization of the sample based on event completion. A 
total of 84 sample firms (28 percent) are acquired and 109 firms (37 percent) engage in a 
divestiture. The 109 divestitures include 10 spinoffs, 6 equity carve-outs, 73 asset sales 
and 20 divestiture programs, defined as sales of multiple divisions. 
A total of 16 firms (5 percent) are defined to have an unsuccessful restructuring. 
These firms made an intermediate announcement of an acquisition offer or an agreement 
to divest that was later cancelled. This category includes 13 firms in an unsuccessful 
acquisition and 3 firms in an unsuccessful divestiture. 
As also reported in Table 4, however, this narrow definition of an unsuccessful 
restructuring understates the cases where restructuring does not come to fruition. Thirty-  8
six firms (12 percent) complete the restructuring process by announcing that they are no 
longer for sale. For example, on June 21, 1993, the Wall Street Journal reported that 
Tambrands was exploring a possible sale of the company. Although there were rumors of 
possible bidders, no definitive acquisition offers arose. On September 30, 1993, 
Tambrands announced that it would remain as an independent entity. 
A further 20 firms (7 percent) complete the restructuring process by announcing 
bankruptcy. Finally, 33 firms (11 percent) that that initially announced the intent to 
consider restructuring make no subsequent public statement related to restructuring and 
are categorized as having no completion announcement.  
Table 5 divides the sample into two five-year periods, 1989-1993 and 1994-1998, 
to report the incidence of the event completion categories over time. As already noted 
from Table 1, there are more restructuring announcements in the second half of the 
sample. Another distinct difference between time periods is the incidence of the “no 
longer for sale” category. In the 1989 to 1993 period, 27 of the firms (21 percent) 
ultimately announce that they are no longer for sale. By contrast, in the 1994 to 1998 
period, only 9 of the firms (5 percent) announce that they are no longer for sale. Hence, 
not only are there more initial restructuring announcements in the second half of the 
sample, but the rate of completed restructuring is higher: in the 1989 to 1993 period, 55 
percent of the firms are acquired or divest, while in the 1994 to 1998 period, 73 percent 
of the firms are acquired or divest. 
The differential rate or restructuring in the first and second half of the 1990s 
appears to be tied to overall economic conditions. Using data from Yahoo Finance, we 
can compute the annual return on the S&P 500 for intervals within the period of the   9
sample, 1989-1998. For the first five years of the sample, 1989-1993, the mean annual 
return of the S&P 500 was 12 percent (median = 7 percent). By contrast, for the second 
half of the sample, 1994-1998, the mean annual return of the S&P 500 was 22 percent 
(median = 27 percent). The improved economic conditions proxied by the higher returns 
in the stock market in the second half of the 1990s appear to be associated with a greater 
incidence of proposed as well as completed restructurings. 
The association between the completion rate of restructuring and the state of the 
economy is of direct importance to practitioners of risk arbitrage. Commenting on the 
state of the merger market in the first half of the 1990s, a December 7, 1992, article in 
Investment Dealers’ Digest asks “Is Risk Arbitrage Dead?” An arbitrageur quoted in the 
article states, “The key is recession, doing merger arbitrage in a recession. This is a 
period of time when you shouldn’t do merger arbitrage.” Confirming this sentiment with 
data on 4,750 mergers over the 1963 to 1998 time period, Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) 
find that merger deals are more likely to fail in down markets. 
1.E. The Interaction of Initial and Completion Categories 
To further study the nature of the restructuring of the sample firms, Table 6 
reports the interaction of the initial announcement categories (described in Table 2) and 
the event completion categories (described in Table 4). Panel A reports the number of 
observations in each cross category. All of the cells are non-zero, indicating that each 
initial category has a variety of outcomes. 
Panel B of Table 6 reports the fraction of completion outcomes for each initial 
announcement category. Although each of the initial announcement categories has a 
variety of outcomes, there are some observable differences in outcomes across categories.   10
More than half of the firms in the outside pressure category are subsequently acquired. 
Similarly, 45 percent of the firms that indicate that the restructuring includes a possible 
sale of the company are subsequently acquired. By contrast, only 29 percent of the firms 
that make a general initial restructuring announcement are later acquired. For the firms 
that initially announce that the potential restructuring entails a specific division, 87 
percent actually divest a division. 
1.F. The Length of the Restructuring Process 
As a final description of the overall sample, we estimate the length of the 
restructuring process. Information is presented for three intervals: (1) initial 
announcement to intermediate announcement, (2) intermediate announcement to event 
completion, and (3) the full restructuring period from initial announcement to event 
completion. For each interval, the mean and median calendar days are reported, as well as 
the number of observations. 
Data for the full sample are presented in Panel A of Table 7. Data are available 
for the 265 firms with an event completion announcement. The average restructuring 
takes 345 days, or roughly a calendar year. The median restructuring period is 281 
calendar days. For the 209 firms with an intermediate announcement, the data indicate 
that the period prior to the intermediate announcement date comprises the majority of the 
restructuring period. On average, firms announce a potential restructuring 207 days 
before an actual restructuring is publicly reported. 
Panel B of Table 7 indicates that the length of the restructuring period is similar 
across the four initial announcement categories. For each category, restructuring averages 
more than 300 calendar days. Moreover, the interval between the initial and intermediate   11
announcements is longer than the interval between the intermediate announcement and 
event completion. 
Panel C of Table 7 reports the length of restructuring period based on the five 
event completion categories. The longest interval is for the 16 restructurings classified as 
unsuccessful. The shortest interval is for the 36 firms that conclude restructuring by 
announcing that they are no longer for sale. 
 
2. The Auction Sample 
  In this section we look deeper into the restructuring process by studying 50 
sample firms that were acquired via an auction. For these 50 firms, SEC documents 
provide an extremely rich depiction of the decisions entailed in the restructuring process. 
For related use of SEC merger documents, see the analysis of fairness opinions by 
DeAngelo (1990) and the analysis of insider trading by Sanders and Zdanowicz (1992). 
  2.A. Development of the Auction Sample 
To form the auction sample, we begin with the 97 sample firms that were the 
object of an acquisition offer. (See Table 3.) We then searched for SEC filings related to 
the offer. For the 1989 to 1993, we searched the SEC filings on Lexis/Nexis. For 1993 to 
the present, we searched the SEC EDGAR filings. From this search, we could find no 
information on the takeover in 29 cases and found incomplete information in 18 cases.  
For 50 of the acquisition offers, we found information in the SEC documents on 
both the private initiation date of the restructuring process as well as the manner in which 
the auction was conducted. To provide a flavor for the available material, the Appendix 
to this paper provides extensive information taken directly from the SEC documents for   12
two of the firms in the auction sample, Falcon Building Products and Outlet 
Communications. 
  2.B. Length of the Restructuring Process for the Auction Sample 
One of the pieces of information available for the 50 firms in the auction sample 
is the date on which the restructuring process actually began. We label this date the 
private date. This date usually precedes the initial announcement date in our sample. As 
an example, in November 1997, Pete’s Brewing Company privately hired Morgan 
Stanley to assist in analyzing strategic alternatives and then publicly announced this on 
February 17, 1998. 
The cases in the Appendix provide other examples of the time between the private 
date and the initial public announcement date. For Falcon Building Products, on 
September 6, 1996, the firm’s Board of Directors urged management to determine 
appropriate measures to increase shareholder value and in December of the same year the 
firm issued a press release saying that it had hired Merrill Lynch and Smith Barney to 
explore strategic alternatives. For Outlet Communications, on December 16, 1994, the 
firms Board authorized management to retain an investment bank and on March 21, 
1995, the firm issued a press release that it had retained Goldman Sachs to help explore 
strategic alternatives. 
As reported in Table 8, the interval between the private date and the initial 
announcement date averages 112 calendar days for the 50 firms in the auction sample. 
For these firms, the interval from initial announcement to event completion is 348 days. 
Hence, accounting for the private date prior to the public revelation of the intent to 
restructure increases the length of the restructuring period by 32 percent. The length of   13
the interval between the private date and the initial public announcement has a wide 
range. The minimum value is zero, indicating a case where the restructuring process 
begins on the initial announcement date. The maximum value is 606 calendar days. 
Table 8 also bifurcates the auction sample into the 44 successful acquisitions and 
the 6 unsuccessful acquisitions in the auction sample. The unsuccessful acquisitions had a 
longer restructuring interval in total. Moreover, the periods from private date to initial 
announcement and from initial announcement to intermediate date were both lengthier 
for the unsuccessful acquisitions. 
2.C. The Auction Process 
 
In this section, we describe the details of the auction process for the 50 firms in 
the auction sample. The auctions we study resemble the setting in French and 
McCormick (1984) in that the selling firm, rather than a potential bidder, structures the 
takeover process. Many of the cases in the auction sample have hybrid features along the 
lines of the discussion in Klemperer (2002) where an auction is used to determine the 
high bidder and then negotiation is performed to determine the final acquisition price. An 
especially cogent summary of the private auction process is provided in Hansen (2001). 
The private auction process can be summarized as follows. Starting at the private 
date and proceeding through the initial restructuring announcement and the merger 
agreement at the intermediate date, the firms and their investment banks administer the 
auction. The process begins with initial contacts with potential buyers. The next step is 
the signing of confidentiality and standstill agreements where the potential buyers receive 
initial access to non-public information but also make commitments not to initiate 
unsolicited attempts to buy the selling firm. The subsequent stage is detailed due   14
diligence by a select group of potential buyers, where the selection of potential buyers is 
often based on the prices in non-binding bids. The auction process culminates with final 
written offers. 
Table 9 sketches the details of the auction process for one sample firm, Mediq 
Inc. On October 17, 1997, the firm authorized Salomon Smith Barney to conduct an 
auction of the firm and on October 29, 1997, publicly announced that the firm was 
exploring strategic alternatives. In the course of the next month, the firm and its 
investment bank contacted 50 potential buyers and signed confidentiality and standstill 
agreements with 39 firms. By November 17, 1997, Mediq received 20 written indications 
of interest and instructed Salomon to contact the potential buyers that made the six 
highest indications of interest. Each of the six potential buyers visited the firm; three 
made formal written offers. After consideration of the offers and further negotiations with 
the two highest bidders, the Mediq Board approved a merger with Bruckman, Rosser, 
Sherrill & Co. The merger was announced on the newswire on January 15, 1998, and 
appeared in the New York Times the following day. 
Table 10 summarizes the process for the 50 firms in the auction sample. Between 
seven and 174 firms were initially contacted by the selling firms and their investment 
banks. An average of 63.2 potential buyers were initially contacted. The median was 50. 
The case from the Appendix on Falcon Building Products indicates that the number of 
firms contacted is a choice variable for the selling firm.  
Of the firms initially contacted, an average of 28.7 firms (median of 18) indicated 
interest by signing confidentiality agreements. After the initial review of confidential 
information, an average of 6.3 firms continue further due diligence and/or submit   15
preliminary proposals. This reduction in the number of potential bidders at the due 
diligence stage is based both on the choice of the potential buyers as well as the decision 
of the selling firm. For example, in the case of Outlet Communications discussed in the 
Appendix, 12 of the 45 firms signing confidentiality agreements later submitted 
preliminary proposals. The selling firm invited 8 of these twelve firms to conduct further 
due diligence. 
  An average of 2.6 potential bidders submitted binding written offers for the 
selling firms. The median number of written offers was 2. In only 20 percent of the cases 
in the auction sample was there only a single written bid in the auction. 
  The data on the number of bids in the auction can be contrasted with the number 
of competing public bids for the firms in the auction sample. On average, there are 1.3 
competing public bids. The median is 1; indeed, 38 of the 50 firms (76 percent) have only 
a single public bidder. 
  Research such as Schwert (2000) and Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001) often 
classifies the competitiveness of a takeover based on the number of public bidders. Under 
such a classification, the takeovers in our auction sample, like most takeovers in the 
1990s, would be classified as lacking competition. However, the details of the auction 
process reported in Table 10 indicate an extremely competitive setting. 
  The selling firms in the auction sample often use the reported competitiveness of 
the auction process to justify the price of the merger agreement. For example, the board 
of directors of Outlet Communications justified its decision to sell to NBC by noting that 
“NBC's proposal was the result of a five-month public auction process conducted with the assistance of 
Goldman Sachs in which approximately 80 potential acquirors had contacted, or were contacted by, the 
Company or Goldman Sachs, or both, 12 of such parties submitted preliminary acquisition proposals and 
five of such parties submitted definitive acquisition proposals.” [SEC EDGAR, DEF 14C, January 12, 
1996.]   16
 
3. Valuing the Sequential Restructuring Process 
  In this section, we estimate the effect of restructuring on the value of the sample 
firms. While we use traditional event study methods, we take care to capture the 
complexity of the restructuring process that is described in the previous sections of the 
paper by analyzing both the initial consideration of restructuring as well as the 
subsequent definitive restructuring actions. We estimate the wealth effects around the 
three specific restructuring dates: the initial announcement, the intermediate 
announcement, and event completion. As an estimate of the full value of restructuring, 
we also sum the event returns across the different dates. Our procedure resembles that 
used by Mikkelson and Ruback (1985) in their study of 13d announcements. 
  For each date, we estimate returns for two windows: (-1,+1) and (-5,+5), where 
day 0 is the date of the particular announcement as determined from Lexis/Nexis and the 
Wall Street Journal. In results not reported in the paper, we also study the (-20,+20) 
window and obtain similar findings. Our measure of abnormal returns is the net-of-
market, buy-and-hold return, where the market is proxied by the CRSP value-weighted 
index. In results not reported in the paper, we also estimate abnormal returns using a 
market model and by estimating cumulative abnormal returns and obtain similar findings. 
The robustness of the results to various estimation procedures is consistent with Fama’s 
(1991) observations about event studies that employ narrow windows. 
  3.A. Wealth Effects at the Initial Announcement of Restructuring 
Table 11 reports the wealth changes for the sample firms at the initial 
announcement. As reported in Panel A, the initial restructuring announcement is, on   17
average, associated with an increase in shareholder wealth. The average, net-of-market 
return is 6.41 percent for the (-1,+1) window and is comparable in size for the (-5,+5) 
window. The positive and significant returns indicate that the initial announcement is 
viewed by the market as a substantive step toward restructuring, on average. 
Panel B of Table 11 reports the results for sub-samples based on the four initial 
announcement categories. All four categories have positive abnormal returns, on average. 
The largest returns are for the sub-sample where the initial announcement included the 
statement that the firm was considering the possible sale of the entire corporation. 
Recalling from Table 6 that roughly half of these firms were subsequently acquired, the 
above-average returns at the initial announcement likely reflect takeover anticipation by 
the market. 
3.B. Wealth Effects at the Intermediate Announcement of Restructuring 
Table 12 reports the wealth effects at the intermediate restructuring announcement 
date. Data are available for 208 firms: 96 firms that announce that they are the target of 
an acquisition offer and 112 firms that announce an agreement to divest a unit. One of the 
97 firms reported in Table 3 to be the object of an acquisition offer is unavailable for 
analysis because it delists prior to the intermediate announcement date. 
  Panel A of Table 12 indicates that the intermediate announcement of restructuring 
is associated with an average wealth increase for the sample firms. The abnormal return 
for the (-1,+1) window is 5.24 percent and for the (-5,+5) window is 6.80 percent. 
  As reported in Panel B of Table 12, the largest gains at the intermediate date 
accrue to the firms that are the object of an acquisition offer. In the (-1,+1) window 
around the acquisition offer, the abnormal return is 9.85 percent. The abnormal return is   18
slightly larger, 12.31 percent, for the (-5,+5) window. The firms divesting a unit also 
experience positive returns, albeit smaller in magnitude. 
3.C. Combined Wealth Effects for the Initial and Intermediate Announcements 
 
Because of the complex, sequential nature of the restructuring process for the 
firms in our sample, a separate emphasis on either the initial announcement date or the 
intermediate announcement date would underestimate the valuation effects of the 
restructuring that takes place in the sample. To estimate the combined wealth effects 
across the two dates, we sum the returns for the initial and the intermediate 
announcements. The results are reported in Table 13. Panel A indicates that, on average, 
restructuring creates wealth. The abnormal returns for the (-1,+1) window are 12.84 
percent and for the (-5,+5) window are 15.86 percent. 
Panel B of Table 13 reports the results based on the two intermediate 
announcement categories. The results indicate that acquired firms experience large 
summed returns on the initial and intermediate dates. The average abnormal return for the 
(-1+1) window is 22.55 percent and for the (-5,+5) window is 28.64 percent. Firms 
engaging in divestitures also experience a positive appreciation in wealth of more than 4 
percent. 
3.D. Wealth Effects at Event Completion 
To extend the analysis beyond the firms that either are acquired or that engage in 
a divestiture, we next analyze the firms that make any type of event completion 
announcement. In addition to acquisitions and divestitures, this includes firms that file for 
bankruptcy and that announce that they are no longer for sale.   19
Table 14 reports the wealth effects for the 264 firms with an event completion 
announcement. As reported in Panel A, the average abnormal return is negative.  
Panel B of Table 14 reports the results by event completion category. For the 
acquired and divesting firms, the abnormal returns are roughly zero, indicating that the 
completion of the event is not a surprise to the market. By contrast, for the firms that are 
in an unsuccessful restructuring (13 failed acquisitions and 3 failed divestitures), the 
returns at event completion are significantly negative. 
The firms that announce that they are no longer for sale also experience negative 
abnormal returns upon making that announcement. Hence, the cancellation of the 
restructuring for these firms is bad news and is not due to a positive reassessment of their 
operating conditions.  
Similarly, the firms that complete restructuring by filing for bankruptcy also have 
negative abnormal returns in the window around this announcement. The result that the 
bankruptcy filing has incremental, negative information is consistent with Clark and 
Weinstein (1983). 
3.E. The Full Value of Corporate Restructuring 
As an estimate of the full value of corporate restructuring, Table 15 reports the 
combined wealth effects for the three stages of the restructuring process: the initial 
announcement date, the intermediate announcement date, and the event completion date. 
The wealth effects are estimated by summing the abnormal returns for the three dates. 
For the firms in the “no longer for sale” and “bankruptcy” categories, the estimates 
reflect only the initial and event completion dates.   20
Panel A of Table 15 reports the results for the sample of 264 firms with an event 
completion announcement. The results indicate that, on average, restructuring increases 
shareholder wealth. For both the (-1,+1) and (-1,+5) windows, the abnormal return 
averages more than 7 percent. 
Panel B of Table 15 reports the results by event completion category. The results 
indicate that the positive gains from restructuring come from firms that are either 
acquired or that engage in a divestiture. Firms that are acquired have the largest wealth 
appreciation, on the magnitude of 30 percent for the (-5,+5) window. Firms that divest 
units have gains approaching 5 percent. 
Both the firms that are involved in a failed acquisition or divestiture and the firms 
that announce that they are no longer for sale experience insignificant changes in wealth 
for the entire restructuring period. Hence, any positive returns at the initial announcement 
are given up when the restructuring fails to occur. Consistent with prior research on 
mergers (Bradley, Desai and Kim (1983)) and divestitures (Hite, Owers, and Rogers 
(1987)), restructuring must be completed for firms to garner sustained, positive wealth 
effects. 
For the 20 firms where the restructuring process leads to a Chapter 11 filing, the 
combined wealth effects are significantly negative. Among other things, this result 
indicates that one cost of considering restructuring is that the information revealed in the 
restructuring process is not always positive. 
In summary, the event study analysis indicates that restructuring creates value for 
the sample firms, a result consistent with prior research. But the analysis also indicates 
the importance of recognizing the complexity of the restructuring process when   21
estimating the effects on value. Because the firms in our sample restructure via a 
sequential process, it is important to incorporate the initial restructuring consideration, as 
well as the actual restructuring action, to avoid underestimating the effect on shareholder 
value. 
 
4. Runup and Markup for the Auction Sample 
  The event study analysis indicates the importance of capturing the complexity of 
the process when studying the stock market reaction to restructuring announcements. As 
a related illustration of the effect of the underlying process on the interpretation of market 
reactions, we study the stock price behavior of the 50 firms in the auction sample around 
the time of their formal acquisition offer. We estimate the extent to which the runup and 
markup of these firms are affected by the number of bidders in both the private auction 
and public sale of the firm. 
  This analysis is motivated by recent work by Schwert (1996, 2000) that adopts an 
auction framework in studying the runup and markup related to acquisitions. In his 
analysis, Schwert (1996, 2000) classifies a takeover as an auction when there is more 
than one bidder making a formal, public attempt to acquire the target firm. Among other 
things, Schwert (1996, 2000) finds that the markup is higher when there is a public 
auction (i.e., multiple public bidders). 
  As previously discussed in the context of Table 10, the 50 firms in our auction 
sample generally were the subject of competitive bidding prior to any public 
announcement of a formal takeover. Indeed, for a large majority of the firms in the 
auction sample, the public announcement of the acquisition occurs at the end, rather than   22
at the beginning, of the takeover process. To distinguish such competitive bidding from 
the auction terminology used by Schwert (1996, 2000), we label the pre-public auction in 
our sample as the private auction and the bidders in this auction as the private bidders. 
  We follow Schwert (2000) in defining the runup period as the (-63,-1) window 
and the markup period as the (0,+63) window, both relative to the acquisition offer. 
Abnormal returns for these two windows are calculated using a market model that is 
estimated over a 253-day period that ends 127 days before the acquisition offer. 
  The estimates of runup and markup for the auction sample are reported in Table 
16. Panel A indicates that, consistent with prior research, both the runup and markup are 
positive for the 50 firms in the auction sample. Also consistent with prior research, the 
results in Panel B indicate that the markup is much larger for the sample of 12 firms with 
multiple public bidders. 
  Panel C bifurcates the analysis based on the 10 firms with only a single private 
bidder and the 40 firms with multiple private bidders. The results indicate that both the 
runup and the markup are larger for the firms with multiple private bidders. In his 1996 
paper, Schwert (p.188) conjectures that the runup may foreshadow a public auction. The 
results in Panel C of Table 16 suggest that runup may also reflect the depth of the private 
auction. 
  Panel D of Table 16 reports the interaction of the public and private bidder 
categories. There are three combinations, as the auction sample has no cases where there 
is a combination of a single private bidder and multiple public bidders. The results in 
Panel D report an interesting hierarchy. The 10 firms in the auction sample with both a 
single private and a single public bidder have relatively low values for both the run up   23
and the markup. The 28 firms with multiple private bidders but a single public bidder 
have the highest runup but the lowest markup. The 12 firms with both multiple private 
and public bidders have the highest markup. 
  The results for the auction sample suggest a possible reinterpretation of the 
traditional explanation for the variation in takeover premiums across target firms. For 
example, in summarizing his analysis of takeover premiums, Schwert (1996, p.187) 
states, “the type of competition feared by the bidder is the best systematic explanation for 
variation in takeover premiums, and whether this type of competition will occur is not 
generally known before the first bid occurs.” The data describing the auction sample in 
Table 10 suggest, however, that much of the competition in a takeover occurs well before 
the first public announcement of an acquisition offer. Moreover, the results in Table 16 
suggest that the nature of the competition before the first acquisition announcement can 
be as important as the competition subsequent to public revelation of the takeover. 
 
5. Summary and Conclusion 
  In the traditional nomenclature of corporate takeovers, the buying firm is labeled 
the bidder and the selling firm is labeled the target. Such labeling implies that the buyer is 
the initiator of the transaction. The firms in our sample do not fit this standard taxonomy. 
  We begin with a sample of 298 firms that announce the intention to restructure in 
the 1989 to 1998 period. Using the terminology of Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001), our 
sample appears to include firms that voluntarily restructure. We find, however, that only 
70 percent of the firms that initially consider restructuring actually complete the process 
by divesting assets or by being acquired. The rate of completed restructuring is higher in   24
the second part of the sample period, suggesting that economy-wide factors are an 
important facet of the restructuring decision. 
  We also show that an incorporation of the complexity of the process is important 
in valuing the effects of restructuring. Due to the sequential nature of the process of 
restructuring for the sample firms, a full valuation of restructuring includes both the 
announcement of the initial consideration of restructuring as well as the date of the 
definitive restructuring action. 
  Our most novel analysis details the auction procedure used by many of the sample 
firms that are acquired. Defying the traditional taxonomy of the bidder as the initiator of a 
takeover, the firms in the auction sample administer the transaction in a setting 
resembling models such as French and McCormick (1984) and Hansen (2001). These 
auctions usually have more than one bidder submitting a final written offer and indicate 
that the takeover market in the 1990s was much more competitive than is depicted by 
looking only at the number of public bidders. 
  We provide evidence that the depth of the private auction employed by many of 
the sample firms affects the runup preceding the formal acquisition announcement. Our 
evidence on the auction process may also shed light on other extant puzzles in the 
takeover literature. For example, Betton and Eckbo (2000) document both the 
profitability of gaining a toehold and the absence of a toehold in many acquisitions. This 
result may merely stem from the control of the sales process by the selling firm as 
modeled by Bulow, Huang, and Klemperer (1999). 
  As noted by Hansen (1987, pp. 91-93) transactions in the market for corporate 
control include both direct bargaining between a buyer and a seller as well as various   25
forms of auctions. In our future work we plan to delve further into the choice of sales 
methods used in mergers and acquisitions. Using an extended sample, we will analyze the 
factors that determine when selling and buying firms directly negotiate and when the 
selling firms employ an auction.   26
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Appendix. Examples of the Auction Process. 
 
This Appendix provides examples of the auction process for two of the sample firms, 
Falcon Building Products and Outlet Communications. 
 
Each entry lists (i) the sample firm (initial announcement year), (ii) the source document, 
and (iii) excerpts on the auction process taken directly from the source document, 
maintaining spelling and punctuation. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Falcon Building Products (1996) 
 
Source Document: 424B3 Filing, May 22, 1997, SEC EDGAR 
(Note: in the document, the target firm, Falcon Building Products, is referred to as the 
“Company.” The bidder is Investcorp.) 
 
Excerpts on the Auction Process: At a regularly scheduled Board of Director’s meeting 
on September 6, 1996, the Board asked management to determine if there were any 
strategic measures available to increase shareholder value. Pursuant to the Board’s 
directive, management asked Merrill Lynch and Smith Barney, with whom the Company 
had ongoing investment banking relationships, to investigate various strategies to 
enhance stockholder value, including (i) merging the company with logical strategic 
partners and (ii) selling all or parts of the Company to strategic and/or financial buyers. 
Management asked Merrill Lynch and Smith Barney to make preliminary inquiries 
among a limited number of highly qualified potential buyers. 
 
At the regularly scheduled meeting of the Board of Directors on November 13, 1996, 
management, Merrill Lynch, and Smith Barney indicated to the Board that, in the event 
the Board elected to explore alternatives leading to the sale of the Company, it could 
proceed in any of the following ways: (i) continue discussions with the small group of 
potential buyers that Merrill Lynch and Smith Barney had contacted in the hope that one 
or more of them, in an effort to avoid a lengthy auction process, would offer a premium 
price and move quickly to consummate a transaction, (ii) conduct a “controlled auction” 
with a larger group (5-20) of potential buyers or (iii) conduct a full-scale, publicly-
disclosed auction of the Company. 
 
After extensive discussion and evaluation of the advantages and disadvantages of each 
option, the Board authorized management to continue to pursue discussion with the 
buyers that had already been contacted. Thereafter, as directed by the Board, Merrill 
Lynch and Smith Barney continued discussions with the five potential buyers previously 
selected, each of whom had signed confidentiality agreements and received confidential 
information about the Company.  
 
Two of these possible buyers submitted preliminary indications of interest. At a Board 
meeting on November 21, 1996, management and the Financial Advisors reviewed the 
two indications of interest that the Company had received. The Board noted that neither   29
indication of interest was at a price sufficient to justify foregoing a broader sale process. 
The Board decided that a full-scale, publicly disclosed auction represented the best way 
to maximize value for all shareholders. 
 
On December 2, 1996, the Company issued a press release stating that the Company had 
hired Financial Advisors to explore strategic alternatives, including the possible sale of 
the Company or one or more of its business units. The Financial Advisors contacted or, 
as a result of the public announcement, were contacted by 151 parties interested in 
considering the potential acquisition of the entire Company or one or more of its 
operating units. Confidentiality agreements were entered into with 87 potential buyers. 
 
By mid-January 1997, the Company had received 32 written indications of interest from 
potential buyers, 12 of which expressed interest in acquiring the Company as a whole. 
Management, with the Financial Advisors’ assistance, selected 15 potential buyers to 
proceed to the next stage of the auction process. The Company included in this group 11 
of the 12 bidders that expressed interest in acquiring the Company as a whole and four 
bidders that expressed interest in acquiring the DeVilbiss subsidiary. Eleven of such 
potential bidders visited selected manufacturing sites and the remaining four parties 
elected not to proceed further. 
 
On February 10, 1997, each of the 11 remaining potential buyers received a second letter 
requesting that they submit their “best and final” offer by March 12, 1997. On March 12, 
1997, the Company received three offers for the Company and two for the separate sale 
of DeVilbiss. 
 
A special Board of Directors’ meeting was held on March 14, 1997 to review these 
offers. The Board, with the assistance of management and the Financial Advisors, 
determined that the sale of the entire Company provided the most attractive alternative 
for the Company’s stockholders and that the offer from Investcorp was economically and 
structurally superior to the other two offers for the entire Company. At the conclusion of 
the Board meeting, the Board directed management: (i) to negotiate with Investcorp, (ii) 
to notify the second highest bidder that its bid was inadequate and (iii) not to pursue 
further discussions with the lowest bidder for the entire Company or with those bidders 
offering to purchase DeVilbiss alone. 
 
Consistent with the terms of the bidding process, the specific terms of the three bids were 
not disclosed to the other bidders. However, pursuant to the Board of Directors’ direction, 
the second highest bidder was informed that its bid was inadequate. On Tuesday March 
18, 1997, the second highest bidder submitted a revised bid, but its revised offer price 
($17.50 per share) remained less than the price per share ultimately offered by 
Investcorp. 
 
Negotiations with Investcorp began on March 17 and continued through March 20, 1997. 
At a special meeting of the Board of Directors on March 20, 1997, the Board voted to 
accept the Investcorp offer. 
________________________________________________________________________   30
 
 
Outlet Communications (1995) 
 
Source Document: DEF 14C, January 12, 1996, SEC EDGAR 
(Note: in the document, the target, Outlet Communications, is referred to as the 
“Company.”) 
  
Excerpts on the Auction Process: During the last quarter of 1994 and the first quarter of 
1995, the Company was approached by several parties interested in discussing an 
acquisition of the Company. The Company entered into confidentiality agreements and 
had informal discussions with several of these parties. 
  
On December 16, 1994, the Board authorized management to retain an investment banker 
to assist the Company in exploring various strategic alternatives to enhance stockholder 
value. On February 7, 1995, the Company engaged Goldman, Sachs & Co. ("Goldman 
Sachs") as its financial advisor to assist the Board in connection therewith. 
 
On March 21, the Company issued a press release announcing that it had retained 
Goldman Sachs as its financial advisor to help the Company explore strategic 
alternatives, including a possible business combination, the sale of all or a portion of the 
Company, potential acquisitions or other similar transactions. 
      
Thereafter, with the assistance of its financial and legal advisors, the Board evaluated a 
variety of strategic alternatives for the Company. The Board determined that, as a part of 
such evaluation, offers for the acquisition of the Company should be solicited pursuant to 
a controlled auction process. The Board authorized Goldman Sachs to begin contacting 
potential acquirors for the Company. During March, April and May, approximately 80 
interested parties contacted, or were contacted by, the Company or Goldman Sachs, or 
both. In April and May, 45 interested parties entered into confidentiality agreements with 
the Company in order to receive confidential information regarding the Company to 
assist each such party in making a preliminary proposal for the Company or portions 
thereof. 
  
In response to a request from Goldman Sachs for preliminary proposals, on or prior to 
May 17, 12 such proposals were received, 10 for the entire equity interest in the 
Company (ranging in value from approximately $32.00 per share to $38.00 per share) 
and two for less than all the assets of the Company. Of these 12 bidders, eight were 
invited to conduct due diligence with respect to the Company and attend management 
presentations during May and June in anticipation of submitting final proposals on June 
28. In addition, NBC also requested access to the Company's confidential information 
and, after signing a confidentiality agreement, was permitted to perform due diligence. 
  
On June 28, five of the nine bidders who performed due diligence on the Company 
submitted definitive proposals to acquire the Company, ranging in value from 
approximately $246 million ($36.25 per share) to $289 million ($42.25 per share). In this   31
round of bidding, NBC submitted an offer of $38.00 per share in the form of common 
stock of General Electric Company, a New York corporation ("GE"), the parent of NBC. 
NBC's offer also provided that NBC would be prepared to acquire the Company for 
equivalent consideration in an all-cash transaction. Renaissance Communications Corp., a 
Delaware corporation ("Renaissance"), submitted an offer of $42.25 per share in cash. 
  
On June 29 and 30, the Company and its financial and legal advisors negotiated the terms 
of a merger agreement with Renaissance (the "Renaissance Merger Agreement") 
providing for the acquisition of the Company by Renaissance for $42.25 per share in cash 
(the "Renaissance Merger"). 
  
On June 30, the Board met to consider the Renaissance offer. The Renaissance Merger 
Agreement was executed later the same day and a joint press release was issued 
announcing the Renaissance Merger Agreement. 
       
On July 28, the Board received a written offer from NBC to acquire the Company for 
$47.25 per share in cash. On July 31, the Company issued a press release announcing that 
it had received the NBC proposal and would consider it.  
 
On August 2, the Board met to consider and act upon NBC's proposal and on any revised 
proposal that might be received from Renaissance. Based upon the Board's review and 
consideration of the terms of the Merger Agreement and, among other things, the oral 
opinion of Goldman Sachs, the Board members who were present unanimously 
determined that the Merger is fair to, and in the best interests of, the Company and the 
holders of Company Common Stock, approved the Merger Agreement and recommended 
that the holders of outstanding shares of Company Common Stock approve and adopt the 
Merger Agreement. The Board also simultaneously terminated the Renaissance Merger 
Agreement.  
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Table 1. Sample by Year of Initial Announcement of Restructuring. This table 
reports the number and size of the sample firms by year of the initial announcement of 
restructuring. The sample was formed via keyword searches on Lexis/Nexis 
(electronically) and the “Divestiture” section of the Wall Street Journal Index (manually) 
for firms announcing that they were considering or evaluating “strategic alternatives” or 
“strategic options.” There are a total of 298 firms across the 1989-1998 period. Firm size 




        Firm  Size  ($millions) 
 
Year    # Observations  % of Sample    Mean    Median 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
1989      20      6.7%          95      40 
 
1990    24       8.1%          551   122 
 
1991    34   11.4%          850       84 
 
1992    24       8.1%    1,223   160 
 
1993      28      9.4%        638      56 
 
1994    23       7.7%    3,618   723 
 
1995    33   11.1%    1,505   265 
 
1996    38   12.8%    2,533   358 
 
1997    22       7.4%    9,231   138 
 
1998    52   17.4%    3,085       63 
 
 





Table 2. Categorization by Initial Announcement of Restructuring. This table reports the incidence of the sample across four 
initial announcement categories. The initial announcements were categorized by reviewing both the announcement itself and the news 
stories for the 298 sample firms in the preceding year. The sample was formed via keyword searches on Lexis/Nexis (electronically) 
and the “Divestiture” section of the Wall Street Journal Index (manually) for firms announcing that they were considering or 





Category    # Observations  % of Sample    Description of the Announcement Category 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Outside  Pressure  33   11%    Considering  restructuring after a failed merger, blockholder  
            activity, or proxy contest, as reported in the announcement story 
       and/or  news  stories within the previous year.  
 
 
Possible  Sale  96   32%    Announcement  states  that sale of the entire firm is one of the 
       restructuring  alternatives  to  be  considered. 
 
 
General  Restructuring   75   25%    Broad  statement  that firm is considering restructuring alternatives. 
         No  specifics  about  the  sale of the entire firm or a division. 
 
 
Specific  Division   94   32%    Announcement  states that firm is reviewing options for a 
         division  or  subsidiary  of  the  firm. 
 
 
Full  Sample    298   100%   34
Table 3. Sample Categorized by Intermediate Announcement of Restructuring. This 
table reports the distribution of the sample across three intermediate announcement 
categories. The categorization is based on a review of Lexis/Nexis, the Wall Street 
Journal, and other financial media in the period subsequent to the initial announcement 
date. Acquisition Offer refers to firms for which there is an announcement that the firm is 
the object of an acquisition offer. To Divest Unit refers to firms that announced a planned 
divestiture. No Intermediate Announcement refers to firms that did not announce an 






Category     #  Observations  %  of  sample 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Acquisition  Offer         97    33% 
 
  
To  Divest  Unit    112    37% 
 
 




Full  Sample      298    100% 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 4. Sample Categorized by Event Completion. This table reports the distribution 
of the sample across six event completion categories. The categorization of event 
completion is based on a review of Lexis/Nexis, the Wall Street Journal, and other 
financial media in the period subsequent to the initial announcement date. Acquired refers 
to firms that were taken over. Divested refers to firms that completed a divestiture of a 
unit(s). Unsuccessful refers to firms that announced that they were the object of a formal 
agreement that was later terminated. (This category includes 3 cancelled divestitures.) No 
Longer for Sale refers to firms that never received an acquisition offer and ended the 
restructuring attempt by stating that they were no longer seeking a buyer. Bankruptcy 
refers to firms that filed for Chapter 11. No Completion Announcement refers to firms 





Event Completion Category    # Observations  % of Sample 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Acquired          84    28% 
 
 
Divested        109    37% 
 
 
Unsuccessful          16    5% 
 
 
O t h e r        
 
  No Longer For Sale        36      12% 
 
 Bankruptcy         20        7% 
 




Full  Sample      298    100% 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 5. Event Completion by Time Period. This table reports the distribution of the 
six event completion categories over time. The placement in a time period is based on the 
initial announcement date. The categorization of event completion is based on a review of 
Lexis/Nexis, the Wall Street Journal, and other financial media in the period subsequent 
to the initial announcement date. Acquired refers to firms that were taken over. Divested 
refers to firms that completed a divestiture of a unit(s). Unsuccessful refers to firms that 
announced that they were the object of a formal agreement that was later terminated. 
(This category includes 3 cancelled divestitures.) No Longer for Sale refers to firms that 
never received an acquisition offer and ended the restructuring attempt by stating that 
they were no longer seeking a buyer. Bankruptcy refers to firms that filed for Chapter 11. 
No Completion Announcement refers to firms that were not acquired, did not divest a 




Event Completion          1989-1993        1994-1998 
Category     #  obs  %  obs    #  obs  %  obs 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Acquired     32  25%    52  31% 
 
 
Divested       39  30%    70  42% 
 
 
Unsuccessful         6    5%    10      6% 
 
 
O t h e r        
 
  No Longer For Sale    27  21%        9    5% 
 
  Bankruptcy        8    6%      12    7% 
 





Full  Sample     130  100%    168  100% 
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Table 6. Interaction of Initial Announcement Category and Event Completion Category. This table reports the interaction of the initial announcement 
(described in Table 2) and event completion (described in Table 4). 
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel A. Number of Observations 
 
         E v e n t   C o m p l e t i o n  
 
         N o   L o n g e r     N o   C o m p l e t i o n  
Initial Announcement Acquired  Divested    Unsuccessful for  Sale   Bankrupt Announcement   Subsample 
 
Prior Activity    18      2      2      5      2      4      33 
 
Possible  Sale   43       7       6   22   10       8    96 
 
General Restructuring  22    18      7      5      7    16      75 
 




Panel B. Fraction Based on Initial Announcement 
 
         E v e n t   C o m p l e t i o n  
 
         N o   L o n g e r     N o   C o m p l e t i o n  
Initial Announcement Acquired  Divested    Unsuccessful for  Sale   Bankrupt Announcement   Subsample 
 
Prior  Activity   55%       6%       6%   15%       6%   12%    100% 
 
Possible  Sale   45%       7%       6%   23%   10%       8%    100% 
 
General Restructuring  29%    24%      9%      7%      9%    21%      100% 
 
Specific Division     1%    87%      1%      4%      1%      5%      100% 
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Table 7. Length of the Restructuring Period. This table reports the mean (median) length of 
time, in calendar days, of the restructuring period for the sample firms. Note that 89 firms do not 
have an intermediate announcement and 33 firms do not have an event completion. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
    Initial  to  Intermediate   Initial  to   
Sample     Intermediate   to  Completion   Complete 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel A. Full Sample 
 
Full  Sample    207  (141)   149  (120)   345  (281) 
    N=209    N=209    N=265 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel B. Categorized by Initial Announcement 
 
 
Prior  Activity    218  (126)   177  (151)   390  (306) 
    N=22    N=22    N=29 
 
Possible  Sale    213  (140)   160  (145)   331  (268) 
    N=56    N=56    N=88 
 
General Restructuring    234 (172)    167 (133)    388 (319) 
    N=47    N=47    N=59 
 
Specific Division    184 (141)    124 (99)    315 (256) 
    N=84    N=84    N=89 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel C. Categorized by Event Completion 
 
 
Acquired    200  (123)   170  (151)   369  (303) 
    N=84    N=84    N=84 
 
Divested  Unit    203  (150)   127  (100)   330  (273) 
    N=109    N=109    N=109 
 
Unsuccessful    267  (174)   191  (107)   458  (384) 
    N=16    N=16    N=16 
 
No  Longer  for  Sale   n.a.    n.a.    256  (220) 
          N = 3 6    
 
Bankruptcy    n.a.    n.a.    391  (367) 






Table 8. Auction Sample: Length of the Restructuring Process. This table reports the mean [median] length of time, in calendar 
days, of the restructuring period for 50 sample firms undergoing an auction. The Private Date is determined by reading the “Merger 
Background” section of the SEC filings related to the acquisition. 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
   Private  Date  to   Initial  to   Intermediate  to  Private  Date  to 




Full  Auction    112     198    150     460     





Successful    101     177    147     425 
Acquisitions  (N=44)   [70]     [115]    [121]     [384] 
 
 
Unsuccessful    194     357    166     717 
Acquisitions  (N=6)   [171]     [323]    [141]     [661] 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 9. Auction Process for Mediq Inc. (source: S-4, SEC EDGAR, Feb. 13, 1998) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Date    Event 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Oct. 17, ‘97  Company authorized Salomon Smith Barney to conduct an auction  
 
Oct. 29, ‘97  Press release: Salomon Smith Barney to explore strategic alternatives, 
including the possible sale of the Company. 
 
Oct. 17 to  50 potential buyers contacted.  
Nov. 17, ‘97  Confidentiality and standstill agreements with 39 potential buyers. 
 
Letter setting forth the procedures of the auction process, the deadline for 
firm offers and other bidding requirements sent to potential buyers. 
 
Nov. 17, ‘97  20 written indications of interest had been received.  
 
Salomon Smith Barney to contact the six highest indications of interest.  
 
Dec. 3, ‘97  The six potential buyers conducted extensive meetings with  
to Jan. 8, ‘98  members of the Company’s senior management, visited Company 
headquarters and had access to the Data Room. 
 
Jan. 8, ‘98  Company received written offers from 3 of the six second-round bidders. 
 
Jan. 9, ‘98   Board determined that the proposal from BRS was best offer. 
Board directed executive management, with assistance of advisors, to  
(i) commence negotiations with BRS,  
(ii) ascertain whether the second highest bidder would raise its bid,  
(iii) not hold discussion with the third bidder at that time. 
  
Second highest bidder not willing to increase its bid. 
 
Jan. 11, ‘98  BRS was asked to increase the value of its bid.  
    Increased the cash portion of its bid. 
 
Jan.14, 1998  Mediq Board voted unanimously to approve the Merger. 
 
Jan 15, ’98  PR Newswire story on Lexis/Nexis: 
    “Bruckmann, Rosser, Sherrill & Co., Inc. to Acquire Mediq Incorporated” 
 
Jan 16, ’98  New York Times: “Mediq Agrees to Be Acquired for $526 Million” 
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Table 10. The Auction Process. This table describes the process for 50 sample firms undergoing a private auction. The information 
on the auction process is taken from the “Merger Background” section of the SEC filings related to the acquisition. Contact refers to 
the number of potential bidders initially contacted by the target firm and/or the firm’s investment bank. Confidentiality refers to the 
number of potential bidders that sign confidentiality agreements. Due Diligence refers to the number of potential bidders accepting the 
invitation to perform advanced due diligence of the target firm. Written Private Offers refers to the number of bidders that submit 
binding written offers for the target firm. Competing Public Bids refers to the number of competing bidders that make a formal, 
publicly announced offer for the target firm. Note that not all variables have a complete set of 50 observations due to the absence of 
some data in the SEC documents. 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
           Written  Competing 




Mean    63.2    28.7    6.3   2.6    1.3 
 
Median  50    18    5   2    1 
 
Maximum   174    87    20   6    3 
 
Minimum   7    2    1   1    1 
 
#  Observations 37    35    39   50    50 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 11. Wealth Effects at the Initial Announcement of Restructuring. This table 
reports the shareholder wealth effects at the initial announcement of restructuring for the 
298 sample firms. Sample formation is described in Table 1. Panel A reports the results 
for the full sample and Panel B reports the results for the four initial announcement 
categories described in Table 2. The estimates of wealth effects are net-of-market, buy-
and-hold abnormal returns, where the market index is the CRSP value-weighted index. 
The estimates are provided for two event windows, (-1,+1) and (-5,+5), where day 0 is 
the date of the initial announcement of the restructuring as determined from Lexis/Nexis 
and the Wall Street Journal. The reported statistics are mean (p-value of the t-statistic 
testing the null hypothesis that the mean abnormal return equals zero) and median (p-




    Mean  (p-value),  Median  (p-value) 
 
    (-1,+1)     (-5,+5) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel A. Full Sample [N=298] 
 
 Mean    6.41%  (<.001)    7.19%  (<.001) 




Panel B. Sample Categorized by Initial Announcement 
 
Prior  Activity    6.88%  (0.011)    6.91%  (0.005) 
[N=33]     1.83%  (0.015)    2.05%  (0.005) 
 
 
Possible  Sale    12.23%  (<.001)   13.93%  (<.001) 
[N=96]     11.40%  (<.001)   11.26%  (<.001) 
 
 
General Restructuring   3.00% (0.130)     3.21% (0.178) 
[N=75]     2.64%  (0.043)    3.84%  (0.043) 
 
 
Specific  Division   3.05%  (<.001)    3.59%  (<.001) 
[N=94]     1.33%  (<.001)    2.45%  (<.001) 
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Table 12. Wealth Effects at the Intermediate Announcement of Restructuring. This 
table reports the shareholder wealth effects at the intermediate announcement of 
restructuring. Sample formation is described in Table 1. The two intermediate 
announcement categories are described in Table 3. Panel A reports the results for the full 
sample of 208 firms making intermediate announcements. (Note that one firm is delisted 
prior to making an intermediate announcement.) Panel B reports the results for the two 
intermediate announcement categories. The estimates of wealth effects are net-of-market, 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns, where the market index is the CRSP value-weighted 
index. The estimates are provided for two event windows, (-1,+1) and (-5,+5), where day 
0 is the date of the intermediate announcement of the restructuring as determined from 
Lexis/Nexis and the Wall Street Journal. The reported statistics are mean (p-value of the 
t-statistic testing the null hypothesis that the mean abnormal return equals zero) and 




    Mean  (p-value),  Median  (p-value) 
 
    (-1,+1)     (-5,+5) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel A. Full Sample [N=208] 
 
 Mean    5.24%  (<.001)    6.80%  (<.001) 




Panel B. Sample Categorized by Intermediate Announcement 
 
Acquisition  Offer   9.85%  (<.001)    12.31%  (<.001) 
[N=96]     8.82%  (<.001)    10.41%  (<.001) 
 
 
To Divest Unit    1.28% (0.087)     2.07% (0.157) 
[N=112]    0.54%  (0.095)    -0.15%  (0.815) 
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Table 13. Combined Wealth Effects for the Initial and Intermediate Announcements of 
Restructuring. This table reports the summed shareholder wealth effects for the initial and 
intermediate announcements of restructuring. Sample formation is described in Table 1. Panel A 
reports the results for the full sample of 208 firms making intermediate announcements. (Note 
that one firm is delisted prior to making an intermediate announcement.) Panel B reports the 
results for the two intermediate announcement categories described in Table 3. The estimates of 
wealth effects are net-of-market, buy-and-hold abnormal returns, where the market index is the 
CRSP value-weighted index. The estimates are provided for two windows, (-1,+1) and (-5,+5), 
where day 0 is the date of the announcement as determined from Lexis/Nexis and the Wall Street 
Journal. The reported statistics are mean (p-value of the t-statistic testing the null hypothesis that 
the mean abnormal return equals zero) and median (p-value of a signed rank test). 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
    Mean  (p-value),  Median  (p-value) 
 
    ( - 1 , + 1 )      ( - 5 , + 5 )  
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel A. Full Sample [N=208] 
 
 Mean    12.84%  (<.001)    15.86%  (<.001) 




Panel B. Sample Categorized by Intermediate Announcement 
 
Acquisition  Offer   22.55%  (<.001)    28.64%  (<.001) 
[N=96]     21.96%  (<.001)    24.38%  (<.001) 
 
To  Divest  Unit    4.54%  (0.001)    4.70%  (0.028) 
[N=112]   2.90%  (<.001)    2.98%  (0.003) 
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Table 14. Wealth Effects at Event Completion. This table reports the shareholder 
wealth effects at the announcement of the completion of restructuring. Sample formation 
is described in Table 1. Panel A reports the results for the full sample of 264 firms with 
event completion announcements. (Note that one firm is delisted prior to the intermediate 
announcement and 33 firms have no observed completion announcement.) Panel B 
reports the results for the five event completion categories described in Table 4. The 
estimates of wealth effects are net-of-market, buy-and-hold abnormal returns, where the 
market index is the CRSP value-weighted index. The estimates are provided for two 
event windows, (-1,+1) and (-5,+5), where day 0 is the date of the event completion 
announcement as determined from Lexis/Nexis and the Wall Street Journal. The reported 
statistics are mean (p-value of the t-statistic testing the null hypothesis that the mean 
abnormal return equals zero) and median (p-value of a signed rank test). 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
    Mean  (p-value),  Median  (p-value) 
 
    (-1,+1)     (-5,+5) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel A. Full Sample [N=264] 
 
 Mean    -3.51%  (<.001)  -5.49%  (<.001) 
 Median  -0.63%  (0.001)  -1.45%  (<.001) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel B. Sample Categorized by Event Completion 
 
Acquired    1.09%  (0.164)    0.33%  (0.635) 
[N=83]     -0.05%  (0.969)  -0.29%  (0.592) 
 
 
Divested    -0.40%  (0.576)  0.47%  (0.683) 
[N=109]    0.08%  (0.412)    -0.68%  (0.719) 
 
 
Unsuccessful    -13.57%  (0.010)   -23.89%  (.0003) 
[N=16]     -12.51%  (0.011)   -19.04%  (<.001) 
 
 
No Longer for Sale    -10.77% (<.001)    -14.11% (<.001) 
[N=36]     -7.21%  (<.001)  -11.22%  (<.001) 
 
 
Bankruptcy    -22.90%  (0.012)   -31.78%  (0.001) 
[N=20]     -14.43%  (0.007)   -22.23%  (0.001) 
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Table 15. Combined Wealth Effects at for the Initial, Intermediate and Event 
Completion Announcements. This table reports the summed shareholder wealth effects 
for the three announcements of corporate restructuring restructuring. Sample formation is 
described in Table 1. Panel A reports the results for the full sample of 264 firms with 
event completion announcements. (Note that one firm is delisted prior to the intermediate 
announcement and 33 firms have no observed completion announcement.) Panel B 
reports the results for the five event completion categories described in Table 4. The 
estimates of wealth effects are net-of-market, buy-and-hold abnormal returns, where the 
market index is the CRSP value-weighted index. The estimates are provided for two 
event windows, (-1,+1) and (-5,+5), where day 0 is the date of the announcement as 
determined from Lexis/Nexis and the Wall Street Journal. The reported statistics are 
mean (p-value of the t-statistic testing the null hypothesis that the mean abnormal return 
equals zero) and median (p-value of a signed rank test). 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
    Mean  (p-value),  Median  (p-value) 
    (-1,+1)     (-5,+5) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel A. Full Sample [N=264] 
 
 Mean    7.35%  (<.001)    7.47%  (0.001) 
 Median  4.80%  (<.001)    6.33%  (<.001) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel B. Sample Categorized by Event Completion 
 
Acquired    23.21%  (<.001)   29.53%  (<.001) 
[N=83]     21.20%  (<.001)   23.01%  (<.001) 
 
 
Divested    4.75%  (0.002)    4.91%  (0.049) 
[N=109]    3.20%  (<.001)    2.68%  (0.028) 
 
 
Unsuccessful    8.93%  (0.283)    -0.10%  (0.994) 
[N=16]     6.54%  (0.231)    6.17%  (0.900) 
 
 
No Longer for Sale    -3.94% (0.163)    -5.72% (0.148) 
[N=36]     -0.23%  (0.367)  -4.09%  (0.271) 
 
 
Bankruptcy    -25.19%  (0.023)   -40.51%  (0.001) 
[N=20]     -22.20%  (0.036)   -39.90%  (0.001) 
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Table 16. Runup and Markup for the Auction Sample. This table reports the runup and 
markup for the 50 sample firms with data available on the auction process. Details of the auction process 
are described in Table 13. Runup is estimated over the (-63,-1) period and markup is estimated over the (0, 
+63) period, both relative to the acquisition announcement date. For each firm, the abnormal returns are 
calculated with a market model estimated over a 253 day period that ends 127 days before the acquisition 
announcement. Panel A reports the mean (p-value of the t-statistic testing the null hypothesis that the mean 
abnormal return equals zero) for the full sample of 50 observations. Panel B reports the results based on the 
number of public bidders, where Multiple Public Bidders refers to cases where more than one firm made a 
competing offer for the target. (Note that in theses case, the announcement date is the first acquisition 
announcement.) Panel C reports the results based on the number of private bidders, where Multiple Private 
Bidders refers to cases where more than one firm made a formal written offer for the target in the auction. 
Panel D reports the results based on an interaction of the number of public and private bidders. (Note that 
in the auction sample, there are no observed cases of a single private bidder and multiple public bidders.) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
     Runup    Markup 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel A. Full Sample [N=50] 
 
  Mean  (p-value)   10.58%  (0.006)   7.84%  (0.031) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel B. Sample Based on the Number of Public Bidders 
 
Single Public Bidder      11.33% (0.009)   4.08% (0.319) 
[ N = 3 8 ]        
 
Multiple Public Bidders     8.19% (0.349)    19.74% (0.010) 
[ N = 1 2 ]       
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Panel C. Sample Based on the Number of Private Bidders 
 
Single Private Bidder      3.61% (0.723)    4.29% (0.739) 
[N=10] 
 




Panel D. Sample Based on the Number of Private and Public Bidders 
 
Single Private, Single Public    3.61% (0.723)    4.29% (0.739) 
[N=10] 
 
Multiple Private, Single Public   14.09%  (0.003)   4.01%  (0.255) 
[N=28] 
 
Multiple Private, Multiple Public  8.19% (0.349)    19.74% (0.010) 
[N=12] 
______________________________________________________________________________ 